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"A DISCRIMINATION SO TRIVIAL":
A NOTE ON LAW AND THE SYMBOLISM OF WOMEN'S DEPENDENCY
Kenneth L. Karst*
Until next January 1, a woman in California is permitted to register
to vote only if she states her name as "Miss" or "Mrs."' Men are not
required to use any particular designation or state their marital status,
Challenging this law's validity, two women sought to register using the
designation "Ms." When the county registrar of voters refused to pro-
cess their registrations, the women petitioned the superior court for a
writ of mandate to compel their acceptance. That court sustained the
registrar's demurrer and dismissed the petitions. In Allyn v. Allison,2
the California court of appeal affirmed in three separate opinions. So
it was that when two of my colleagues at UCLA, both holders of the
Ph.D. degree, sought to register as "Dr.," the male was allowed to do so
while the female was required to register as "Miss." Now, that is one
silly law.
Silliness, of course, is not the same as unconstitutionality, as dissent-
ing opinions sometimes remind us.3  Indeed, it was the very insubstan-
tiality of the law that seemed to prevent the justices of the court of ap.
peal from taking the plaintiffs' claim seriously. Precisely because the
justices thought they were dealing with a constitutional trifle, they failed
to address themselves to the principal issue in the case. The result is not
merely that the case was wrongly decided-the Legislature has now rem-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
Author's note: During the seven years when I had the good luck to be Charlie Callahan's
colleague, I saw him express anger only once. It had been :proposed that the faculty adopt a
rule governing "the use of the examination as a teaching device," and Charlie was outraged,
It was a lesson for me in academic freedom, but Charlie did not describe his objection in those
terms. Instead, he made it clear that no one was going to tell Charlie Callahan how he would
teach his courses. That was the way he taught his colleagues: by example. The thought that
he was teaching us surely never entered his mind.
Apart from being an immensely civilized man, Charlie was what Bob Lynn and Vaughn
Ball call a "straight thinker." He could separate facts from values, and arguments from as.
sumptions, as well as anyone I have ever known. Yet he was genuinely modest, and the
rhetoric of eulogy suits him not at all. So I shall stop after passing on one more bit of
Callahaniana.
After I left Ohio State, Charlie and I continued our exchange of miscellany; several of Ils
contributions now decorate my office. My favorite is in item from the television page of the
Columbus Dispatch, announcing the rerun of an old John Wayne movie:
An undermanned U.S. Cavalry outpost
attempts to repeal invading Indians.
Charlie's caption was: "Rule of Law, overcommitment to."
' CAL. ELEC'IONS CODE § 310 (1961) (West Supp. 1973).
2 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1973).
3 E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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edied that 4 -but that the opinions reinforced the evil that made the law
not merely silly but unconstitutional.
Each of the Allyn opinions deserves attention, much as the works in
Madame Tussaud's basement deserve attention. Justice Compton's opin-
ion assumed that the appropriate standard of review was the "rational
basis" standard and concluded that the law was reasonable "as an aid in
assuring that a previous registration has been cancelled and that a woman
[whose marital status has changed] does not vote twice."5  Weighed
against this state's interest, Justice Compton found the plaintiff's interest
insignificant:
Assuming that compliance with [the law] . . results in the dis-
dosure of marital status, such compliance is not onerous or burden-
some. A woman is not disadvantaged in any way by such disclosure.
There is nothing private about the status of marriage or its termination.0
The contentions of the plaintiffs, Justice Compton concluded, "are more
properly addressed to the Legislature.!"7
Presiding Justice Roth agreed with the plaintiffs that the law's distinc-
tion between male and female registrants was "without apparent solid
reason."' He nonetheless concurred:
4 Calif. Stats. 1974, ch. 74; see also 2 Cal. Legislative Service 208 (West 1974).
5 34 Cal. App. 3d at 452, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The assumptions are that a woman who
marries takes the surname of her husband and that registration as "Mrs." puts the election of-
fidails on notice that the same woman may have been registered previously under her former
surname. The initial assumption was correct at common law, and the rule remains largely un-
changed by statute. See Spencer, A Woman's Right to Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A. L REV. 665
(1973). Six months after the Allyn decision, the Attorney General of California issued an
opinion that a woman who marries has an election under California law either to keep her
name as it has been or to take her husbands' surname. Calif. Ops. Att'y Gen. (March 12,
1974). Even if Justice Compton's assumption that the common law rule prevails in California
were correct, the "Miss"/"Mrs." registration requirement adds nothing in the way of investiga-
tive leads to the existing requirement that every registrant state whether he or she has registered
previously under another name. Justice Compton's opinion said:
It may or may not be true that a listing of former registrations would necessar-
ily provide the same leads to identification as the designation of Miss or Mrs. but
that is not for us to decide.
34 Cal. App. 3d at 452, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
As the above-cited note makes clear, the common law rule itself is constitutionally vulner-
able in situations in which women choose to retain their surnames upon marriage instead of
taking their husbands' names. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
affd per curiam, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), does not refute this statement. In that case, a three-judge district court sustained the validity of Alabama's requirement that a married woman's
drivers license be issued in her "legal name," which included her husband's surname. The
court noted that the state had provided a "simple, inexpensive means" for a married woman
to change her name by applying to a probate court. In any case, the Supreme Court's sum-
mary affirmance of a three-judge court's decision, though formally a decision on the merits,
often is the functional equivalent of a denial of certiorari. See Currie, The Three-Judge Dis-
trict Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 74 n.365 (1964).
634 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
7Id. at 453, 11lb Cal. Rptr. at 80.
8 34 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 110 Cal. Rpr. at 80.
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At bench, however, tle difference complained of is [sc], and over
a long period of years has had, so little effect upon the allegedly wronged
party, that even though it could be probably whipped and beaten into
constitutional proportions, I cannot engender sufficient provocation to
attempt to correct through the judicial process a discrimination so tri-
vial without giving the first opportunity to the Legislature to satisfy all
those truly interested. 9
Any editing of Justice Fleming's opinion would run the risk of omit-
ting a wink here or a knowing chuckle there. The opinion merits quota-
tion in its precious fullness:
Like titles of -military rank the market in titles for women never ceases
to fluctuate. The earlier respected title of MISTRESS has fallen on hard
times, and the once vaunted title of MADAM has suffered a worse fate,
rehabilitative efforts of Frances Perkins and Pearl Mesta notwithstand-
ing. On the other hand the title MISS, probably an abbreviation for
MISTRESS, has risen in the scale from a designation for a concubine to
one for a young unmarried woman, while the title MRS., also an abbrevi-
ation for MISTRESS, has fallen from a title of gentility to one now ex-
tended to all married women without superior titles. Petitioners here
assert a constitutional right to the use of a third title, MS., on the
ground they are affronted and offended by having to choose between
MISS and MRS. and thereby designate their marital status for purposes
of voting registration.
Apart from general custom I find no essential connection between
marital status and use of the titles, MISS and MRS. Actresses today,
even those who have married as many times as the sands of the sea, use
the title MISS. In past centuries the practice was the precise opposite,
and actresses and authoresses used the title MRS. regardless of marital
status, as for example, Mrs. Siddons and Mrs. Hannah More. Nor was
this custom limited to women in public life, for during the 17th and
18th centuries usage of the title MRS. by unmarried women in private
life was common. (See entry for Mrs. in The Oxford English Diction-
ary, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1933).)
In my view a female voter registrant is free to use either of the two
authorized descriptive titles, MISS or MRS., regardless of marital status.
If a choice of two titles is deemed insufficient and a third option is de-
sired, then the remedy lies with the Legislature and not with the courts.1 0
The constitutionality of the California legislation thus rested on a
precarious tripod: (1) one justice's conclusion that the law did not con-
dition registration to vote upon the disclosure of a woman's marital status;
(2) another justice's conclusion that because the law did just that, it
might have been a reasonable safeguard against vote fraud; and (3) a
third justice's conclusion that the law was probably unconstitutional but
9 ld. at 454, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
1ld. at 454-55, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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3omehow de minimis. Two themes run through all the opinions. First,
the plaintiffs are complaining about something paltry. Second, if there
,s anything to complain about, they should complain not to the courts
,ut to the Legislature. Both those propositions are wrong.
I. STATUS, SYMBOL AND SUBSTANCE 1
If California were to require prospective voters to designate their race
n order to register, such declarations might be of some aid in preventing
voting fraud. Justice Compton's opinion seems to embrace such a case:
No invidious discrimination can be found in a reasonable attempt to
identify electors whether by sex or by any other natural and logical means
of classification."-
Presumably, however, Justice Compton would reach a different result in
the hypothetical racial-designation case, even though there were no evi-
dence that any election official had sought to inhibit voting by members
of any race or to use the information about race for any other improper
purpose. What would be the evil in requiring a racial designation for
voters? Would-it not lie primarily in the sphere of symbol?"S
One response might be that racial classifications are distinguishable
because they are "suspect," requiring justification by reference to some
"I am grateful to my colleague Harold Horowitz, Professor of Law at UCLA, for his
many contributions to my thinking on "equality as a fundamental interest." Even the phrase
is his.
12 34 CaL App. 3d at 453, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
1 3 In Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elec., 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va.), aeId per criam
sub nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), the maintenance of racially separate voting,
tax, and property records was held unconstitutional. In Virginia, of course, the potential
harms might have been thought to be more than symbolic. In the same case, the courts ap-
proved the maintenance of racial data in divorce proceedings; the district court remarked that
such data might be useful in keeping vital statistics. Our hypothetical racial designation of
voting registrants would arguably serve a similarly neutral purpose. Yet it seems dear that
such a requirement would be held invalid, even absent any actual discrimination in the elec-
toral process. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), held that Louisiana could not re-
quire the designation of a candidate's race on the ballot. The state, it was held, is constitu-
tionally disabled from encouraging voters to identify candidates according to race, whether
or not any actual racial discrimination by voters might be shown. The Anderson decision
is perhaps most satisfyingly explained as resting on an underlying concern that is broader:
the impropriety of a s:ate's encouraging people to focus on a person's race as a key aspect of
the person's identity. Virginia's requirement of racial designations on property and tax rec-
ords in the Hamm case may be viewed in such a light.
The interest in question may be seen as an aspect of a right of privacy-not in the sense of
"the right to be let alone," which is an unhelpful constitutional catchall, but in its original
sense. The interest in privacy is an interest in selective disclosure, in maintaining control
over the way others see us. Government should have a very good reason for requiring a dis-
closure of one's race. Such a rule is grounded in the historical use of racial designations as
stigmata of caste. However, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) recognizes
that a nonracial "badge of infamy" (in this case, inclusion in a publicly-posted list of exces-
sive drinkers) may also be of constitutional dimension. My argument is merely that the
symbolism of women's dependency deserves similar judicial scrutiny.
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"compelling" state interest-which none of the justices seemed to think
present in the California voting registration case. In California, the easy,
but conclusory, answer is that the state supreme court has already held
that sex, like race, is a "suspect classification.1114  A more meaningful
answer can be found in an examination of the core values of a constitu-
tional principle of equality.
If a city segregates the races on a public beach, the chief harm to the
segregated minority surely is not that it is deprived of the enjoyment of a
few hundred yards of surf. Jim Crow was a system of degradation
imposed by laws that were primarily aimed at symbolizing the inferiority
of blacks.l" Whatever may have been the rationale for Brown v. Board
of Education, 6 the Supreme Court has now definitively established that
any state-supported racial segregation is a denial of the equal protection
of the laws.17  No one would seriously suggest that the reason lies in
anyone's substantive interest (apart from the question of degradation)
in sitting in the front of the bus or swimming in a public pool on Tues-
day rather than Wednesday. It is state sponsorship of the symbolism
of racial inferiority that is unconstitutional.
Inequality is harmful chiefly in its impact on the psyches of the dis-
advantaged. Once a certain subsistence level is attained, what really mat-
ters about inequality is something that happens inside our heads:
The peculiar evil of a relative deprivation ...is psychic or moral; it
consists of an affront; it is immediately injurious insofar as resented or
taken personally, and consequentially injurious insofar as demoraliz-
ing.'8
Dred Scott v. Sandford,"0 in other words, was a landmark decision not
because of its contribution to the arcana of diversity jurisdiction. In the
eyes of whites, to be sure, the decision was important because it limited
14 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
15 See C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966).
16 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17 The principle has been applied to the seating in courtrooms and on buses, and to tile
use of public parks, beaches and golf courses. See the list of cases in G. GUNTHER & N. DOWL-
ING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1426 (8th ed. 1970).
I8 Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L,
REV. 7, 49 (1969). For a comparison of the symbolism of inferiority in cases of race and In
cases of wealth distinctions, see Note, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Mu.
nicipal Services, and lWealth, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 103, 130-38 (1972). A
similar symbolism-of-inferiority argument can be made in support of the decision of the Call.
fornia Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971), holding substantial wealth-based differentials in :;chool-district spending to be un-
constitutional. I have discussed the point in my article, Serrano v. Priest A State Court's
Responsibilities and Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 720, 749-51 (1972).
19 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories. But in the
eyes of blacks, what mattered was that they were branded as "a subordi-
nate and inferior class of beings,"20 incapable of achieving citizenship."'
In modern constitutional parlance, race is a suspect classification primarily
because the dignity of being recognized as a person-a citizen-is itself
a basic right, a "fundamental interest."22
Furthermore, the dignity of citizenship is fundamental in the same way
that the right to vote is fundamental: 3 it is instrumental in the attain-
ment of a wide range of other goods in an achievement-oriented society.
Given the risks and uncertainties that attend decision making, it is not
surprising that one's self-perception is enormously influential in determin-
ing choices-especially those role decisions (about careers, marriage, etc.)
that are themselves crucial in defining one's future. 4 If we are trained to
think of ourselves as incapable of performing a social role, then we will
be incapable. So-called "peasant fatalism," for example, has important
roots in that special sense of futility that is associated with a sense of
personal worthlessness.25  So, also, a central concern of today's women's
20 60 U.S. at 404-05.
21 For one response by northern blacks to this aspect of the decision, see 1 A DOCUMEU-
TARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 392 (H. Aptheker ed. 1951;
paperbound ed. 1965).
It is precisely the fact that the Supreme Court spoke as interpreter of the Constitution that
gave Dred Scott is degrading impact. For a degradation ceremony to succeed, writes Harold
Garfinkel, the denouncer
must make the dignity of the supra-personal views of the tribe salient and accessible
to view, and his denunciation must be delivered in their name... The denouncer
must arrange to be invested with the right to speak in the name of these ultimate
values.
Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SOC. 420, 423 (1956).
22 See Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 493 (1968):
This right to be treated as a person is a fundamental right belonging to all human
beings by virtue of their being human. It is also a natural, inalienable, and absolute
right.
Morris argues that the right to be treated as a person implies a right to a "punishment model"
of treatment for anti-social behavior, as distinguished from a "therapy model." Punishment
assumes that the offender is responsible; therapy is demeaning in its suggestion that the of-
fender "cannot help" his or her acts, any more than an animal can. The value at stake in
Morris' discussion is only secondarily "the right to punishment." It is more basically the
right to be treated as one who is free to make independent choices. It is this sense of being
a person that is undermined by legal rules symbolizing a woman's dependency.
23 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The California Supreme Court has
similarly characterized education as an interest that is fundamental because it is instrumental,
"preservative of other basic civil and political rights .... " Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
607-08, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 618 (1971), quoting from the Reynolds
opinion, 377 U.S. at 562. The Serrano court also made much of the fact that education is
"unmatched in the extent to which it molds the personality of the youth of society." Id. at
(09-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
24 See, e.g., Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behaviorial Science, 49
AM. EcON. REv. 253, 272-74 (1959).
25 See E. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOcIETY 63-65 (paperbound
1974]
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movement is the problem of dependency. The point finds expression in
economic and political terms, but the most destructive dependency of all
is psychological, the dependency that limits a woman's sense of who she
is and what she can do. -6
For the law to contribute its own symbolism of dependency to this
role-confining process is historically understandable but nonetheless un-
acceptable within a serious guarantee of the equal protection of the laws,
The process by which law confers legitimacy on a structure of domina-
tion and dependency is primarily a system of symbols.2 For a court to
add the judiciary's 6wn special imprimatur of legitimacy2 8 on the symbol
ism of women's dependency, is particularly destructive.
Of course, law-any law-implies inequality. Inequality is built into
a system of norms and sanctions;20 legislation necessarily classifieg. And
law, at least law-as-rules, is necessarily a system of symbols. Some sym-
bolism of inequality is thus inescapable if we are to have law. A legal
system constitutionally disabled from employing any such symbolism is a
legal system that cannot function. However, no such self-defeating rem-
edy is required. What is required is a special judicial sensitivity to the
ed. 1967); Ortiz, Reflections on the Concept of "Peasant Culture" and "Peasant Cognitive
Systems," in PEASANTS AND PEASANT SOCIETIES 322, 327-28 (T. Shanin ed. 1971).
26 The literature of the women's movement is growing rapidly, and most of It treats the
theme of dependency. The pervasiveness of the psychological dependency in question is,
sadly, demonstrated by !ome of this very literature. For a perceptive and buoyant comment,
see Fleming, Up From Slavery-to What?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 1974, at 14. There is an ex.
cellent law-oriented analysis of the psychology of dependency in Cavanagh, "A Little Dearer
than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. CIV, RIGHTS--
CIV. LIE. L. REV. 260 (1971); the note includes citations to a wealth of social science material
and is indispensable reading for anyone who wants to pursue the subject of this article. See
also L. KANowITz, SEX ROLES AND SOCIETY: CASES AND MATERIALS, chs. 1 and 2 (1973).
The process of a woman's role-definition is one in whi:h both the woman and others
participate. The title "Ms." is designed, in other words, both for the woman's own consump.
tion and for the edification of the outside world:
A woman who uses the title Ms does not want to be identified solely on the basis of
her marital status, but to be identified as a person with a more complex set of relation.
ships. This means that she must see herself as something more than a wife or non.
wife, and opens up a whole world of possibilities as to how she identifies herself.
But the use of Ms also immediately changes the relationships between the woman
and the people who address her by this title. Most obviously, they must become
aware that she does not consider her marital status to be the main source of her iden-
tity, and thus the whole structure of the society assumed in the Miss/Mrs dichotomy
is called into question.
B. Sonka, Language, Self-Concept and Social Change (unpublished manuscript, 1973). Seen
in this light, the use of the designation "Ms." has political-expression dimensions as well
as the equality dimensions discussed in the text.
27 The obligatory reference is the work of Max Weber. His analysis of legitimacy Is
summarized and made tidy in R. BENDIX, MAX WEBER: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 297-
300 (1960). For Weber's own (rather more diffuse) words, see MAX WEBER ON LAW IN
EcONOMY AND SocIETY 322-37 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
28See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, ch. II (1960).
29 See R. DAHRENDORF, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 167-69 (1968).
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impact of legislative symbolism on any person's sense of first-class citi-
zenship, on any person's sense of individuality, independence and self-
worth. Doctrinally speaking, such sensitivity is conveniently expressed
in the notion that classification on the basis of sex is "suspect," require-
ing justification by a compelling state interest.
That large numbers of women, even a majority, may prefer the desig-
nations of "Miss" and "Mrs." surely is not controlling. Even today some
blacks may choose to ride in the back of the bus. Still, the majority's
preference is relevant to a judicial determination of the meaning that
should be attached to legislative distinctions. For example, when Justice
Roth called the California statute's discrimination "trivial," he very likely
thought that the plaintiffs were straining to take offense at something
innocuous. Since a "person gets from a symbol the meaning he [sic3
puts into it,"30 it would be possible, at least in theory, for anyone who
feels disadvantaged by legislation to find in the law some symbol that is
assertedly degrading. Should every distinction based on sex then be struck
down if one person finds it symbolically degrading?
The principle that sex, like race, is a suspect classification, is not a con-
stitutional commitment to the leveling of all legislative distinctions be-
tween the sexes. The principle merely shifts the burden of justification
to those who assert the validity of any such distinction. Some state in-
terests will surely he held to be "compelling." In the Allyn case, how-
ever, the state's interest is so insubstantial that it not only fails the com-
pelling-state-interest test, but its very lack of substance also heightens the
symbolic impact of the law. Given the statute's obvious futility in reduc-
ing vote fraud,31 its main effect was symbolic: telling a woman that be-
fore she might exercise the most basic function of citizenship, she must
declare how she relates to men.
The refusal of all three justices of the court of appeal to take the
plaintiffs' claim seriously was an additional insult, not exactly softened
by one justice's effort to amuse. The failure of sensitivity that produced
this additional harm was also a doctrinal failure. The fourteenth amend-
ment was designed, first and foremost, as a guarantee of the dignity of cit-
SO The quotation is from Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943). Jackson's point is given special mean-
ing in our context by the ca:e of Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964). In that case, a
black woman refused to answer questions put by a state-court judge who addressed her as
"Mary," saying she would answer if he would call her "Miss Hamilton." The judge cited her
for contempt, and imposed a five-day jail sentence and a $50 fine. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed without opinion, citing Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (state.compelled
courtroom segregation held unconstitutional). The Hamilton case stands primarily for a prin-
ciple of radal equality, but it also recognizes that the dignity of citizenship may be bound up
in a personal title.
3 1 See note 5, supra.
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izenship; it begins by "overruling" Dred Scott. In our own time, the ex-
tension of the equal protection clause to substantive interests other than
racial equality should not blind us to the continued fundamental impor-
tance of the dignity of citizenship. If a legislature enacts into law a dis-
crimination that symbolizes any citizen's dependency, the least we can
ask is that the judiciary insist on a very good reason for the discrimina-
tion.
II. WAITING FOR THE LEGISLATURE
When the Allyn case was decided by the court of appeal, bills were
pending before the Legislature that "would accomplish the result which
[plaintiffs] seek. -"3 2 This consideration undoubtedly played a great part
in-Justice Roth's concurrence and was mentioned in Justice Compton's
opinion as well. The California Supreme Court probably denied a hear-
ing for the same reason; considering that court's previous clear holding
that classification on the basis of sex is suspect, the denial of a hearing
could hardly have been based on its approval on the merits of the de-
cision below. The Legislature has now acted, and plaintiffs will be able
to register as "Ms."-fourteen months after the decision of the court of
appeal.
This deference to the Legislature may have been influenced by the
view that courts should be guided by "a policy of strict necessity in dis.
posing of constitutional issues. '33 However, that policy-as spelled out in
Justice Brandeis' famous Ashwander concurrence84-- is largely a policy
favoring the avoidance of constitutional questions when other grounds
may be found to support a decision. The policy is most assuredly not an
invitation to uphold constitutionally dubious legislation in the anticipa-
tion that it may be amended. No doubt it is desirable to maintain a spirit
of accommodation between the judicial and legislative branches; unneces-
sary confrontations are properly avoided. To that end, the California
court of appeal might have stayed the Allyn decision, avoiding a ruling
on the merits pending legislative action that seemed imminent. Instead,
the court ruled on the merits and validated the legislation, reinforcing
the law's injurious effect by stamping it with the mark of constitutional
legitimacy.
A more serious criticism derives from the previous discussion of the
primacy of the symbolism of citizenship. In a situation involving the
stigma of caste, there is special need for a judicial declaration of uncon-
32 34 Cal. App.3d at 453 n.4, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.4 .
3 3 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947),
34 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
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stitutionality. It would be unthinkable, for example, for a court to up-
hold any official state symbolism of racial inferiority on the ground that
the legislature was considering a repeal of the offending law. The es-
sential harm in such a case is not fully repaired by the repealing legisla-
tion; what the plaintiffs need is an authoritative declaration of their
rights as citizens, not a political accommodation. Brown v. Board of
Education5 means more in American life than any legislative repeal of
school-segregation laws ever could have meant. Because the Supreme
Court is a court, its constitutional invalidation of racial segregation has
given a special form of legitimacy to the movement for racial equality.
Blacks are no longer supplicants for legislative grace; they demand the
rights of citizenship.36 The judiciary has an indispensable role to play in
erasing the symbolism of caste and dependency. Confronted with an
opportunity to fulfill that role, the California justices told the Allyn
plaintiffs to go away and stop bothering them with trifles.
III. SYMBOLISM AND THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Two years ago, Congress approved and submitted to the states for
ratification a proposed twenty-seventh amendment to the United States
Constitution. Its substantive provision, section 1, states:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
The majestic opacity of this language has led some observers to oppose
the amendment on the ground that it is too unspecific, or too rigid, or
perhaps merely duplicative of the equal protection clause.37 In particu-
lar, Paul Freund has expressed reservations about the assumed symbolic
value of the amendment:
The value of a symbol... lies precisely in the fact that it is not meant to
be taken literally, that it is not meant to be analysed closely for its exact
implications .... When.. . we are presented with a proposed amend-
ment to our fundamental law, binding on federal and state governments,
on judges, legislatures and executives, we are entitled to inquire more
circumspectly into the operational meaning and effects of the symbol.
... For if the amendment is not only a needless misdirection of effort in
the quest for justice, but one which would produce anomalies, confusion,
and injustices, no symbolic value could justify its adoption.3 8
35 Note 14, supra.
3 6 See Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MIcH. L Rv. 237, 246A48 (1968).
Judge Carter is the former General Counsel of the NAACP.
3 7 See, e.g., Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HAv. Qiv. RIGHTS-
Cv. LIB. L REv. 234 (1971); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some Probltms of
Construction, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs--CIV. LIB. L. REv. 243 (1971).
3 8Freund, note 37 supra, at 237.
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Since we cannot be sure how courts will interpret the amendment in
such diverse contexts as conscription for military service, particpation in
school athletics, and the relation of differential life expectancies to the
cost of life insurance-so the argument goes--we should address our-
selves not to the enactment of a constitutional slogan but to particular-
ized legislative attacks on specific substantive evils, such as employment
discrimination.3"
The lack of specificity of the amendment is undeniable, but much of
our constitutional law rests on language no more precise. I, for one, am
glad that the framers of the fourteenth amendment, like the framers of
the Bill of Rights, did not seek to spell out a detailed code but were con-
tent with stating general principles in general language. Congress and
the courts were invited to flesh out the fourteenth amendment; 0 in the
same way, they will be invited to give detailed meaning to the proposed
twenty-seventh amendment, and with about as much guidance for specif-
ic applications. The difference, of course, is that women today are politi-
cally articulate far beyond the capacities of the newly freed slaves in
1868, and they will press their constitutional claims to equality in courts
that have become accustomed to responding favorably to analogous
claims of racial equality. It is possible that at least some of the oppo-
nents of the amendment fear a new and "unprincipled" judicial activism
more than they fear any particular change in substantive law.41
The proposed amendment does promise judicial activism in the area
of sex discrimination. The most likely result is not that courts will set
about ending all legislative distinctions based on sex-the expression of
that concern has always seemed more like a debater's point than a real
fear-but rather that the amendment will be interpreted to require gov-
ernment to justify sex distinctions on the basis of compelling interests.
Such a result is compatible with the use of the word "equal" in the pro-
posed twenty-seventh amendment, as it has become compatible with
"equal protection." "Strict scrutiny" of sex distinctions will be the order
of the day, constituting one major doctrinal advance beyond current in-
terpretations of the equal protection clause. Indeed, one reason why the
Supreme Court majority thus far has resisted adding sex to the list of
suspect classifications may be to preserve for the twenty-seventh amend-
ment a meaning independent of the equal protection clause but not de-
parting greatly from its familiar standards. In the meantime, the Court
39 Id. at 238-41.
40 See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Dechion, 69 HARV. L. RIiV.
1 (1955).
4 1 Compare Kurland, note 37 supra, with P. KURLAND, POLITIcs, THm CoNsTirTrloN,
AND THE WARREN COURT, ch. 4 (1970).
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seems bent on achieving many of the results of a strict-scrutiny standard
of review in sex-discrimination cases while not admitting the use of that
standard.42 The proposed amendment will make the more exacting stan-
dard explicit by treating sex as a suspect classification. While that may
not be of great moment at the level of the Supreme Court, it will be of
enormous importance to litigation in the lower courts, where doctrine mat-
ters mightily.
Finally, however, the twenty-seventh amendment will be, in Profes-
sor Freund's own words, "a symbol that the nation has made a commit-
ment to justice for women under law."43  Given judicial decisions like
Allyn v. Allison, such a symbolic statement obviously is not a redun-
dancy, even when addressed to judges. But the Constitution, as Mr. Jus-
tice Black was fond of saying, is not addressed merely to judges. It
speaks to us all, even when it speaks in generalities. Given the primacy
of symbolism in role definition, very likely the twenty-seventh amend-
ment will make its most important marks outside the processes of legis-
lation and litigation. By "raising the consciousness" of both men and
women, the amendment will affect not only lawmaking but the pri-
mary conduct of millions of citizens. If, along the way, judicial sensi-
tivities can be heightened above the levels represented by the Allyn opin-
ions,44 that would also be gratifying.
42 E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
In the Frontiero case, four justices agreed that sex is a suspect classification. Mfr. Justice
Powell's opinion, arguing that the Court should not "unnecessarily" decide this issue while the
equal rights amendment is pending ratification, seems to support the suggestions in the text
as to the majority's view of the amendment.
The one recent decision out of line with the trend suggested is Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct.
1734 (1974), sustaining Florida's annual property tax exemption of $500 for widows (but
not for widowers). In the Kahn opinion, which emphasizes the law's amelioration of eco-
nomic harms resulting from employment discrimination against women, the Court seemed to
be looking over its shoulder at De Funis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973),
dismissed as moot, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
43 Freund, note 37, supra, at 237.
44 These attitudes are in no sense local to California. See Johnston & Knapp, Sex Dis-
crimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675 (1971).
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